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Abstract
In this paper, I explore the consequences of extending the number of firms within an
efficiency-wage competition setting by showing that the shape of the effort function is cru-
cial in determining key features of the economy. Specifically, when workers are endowed with
a concave (sigmoid) effort function, the wage behaviour of firms follows a collusive (competi-
tive) pattern and the symmetric Nash equilibrium is unstable (stable). Moreover, when effort
is concave (sigmoid), full employment is characterized by a labour exploitation that increases
(decreases) together with the number of productive units required to sustain that allocation.
These findings may have intriguing implications for the existence of involuntary unemployment
as well as for policies aimed at increasing employment.
JEL Classification: C72; E12; E24; J41.
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1 Introduction
Some versions of the efficiency-wage theory grounded on adverse-selection recognize that firms may
stand in a situation comparable to monopsony in the labour market, in the sense that employers
might be able to set employment as well as their wage offer aiming at maximizing profits (e.g.
Solow, 1979). As argued by a number of scholars, however, in that theoretical setting a special kind
of competition could hold instead among productive firms (cf. Hahn, 1987; Summers, 1988; van
de Klundert, 1989; Jellal and Wolff, 2003). Specifically, even if the labour market experiences a
1
persistent excess of supply, it can happen that firms will avoid wage cuts not only because this would
lower their profitability, but also because lower wages would enhance the productivity of their output
competitors. In previous works, such a strategic relationship for the optimal wage behaviour of firms
has been dubbed as efficiency-wage competition, i.e., a situation in which the profit-maximizing wage
bid of a given productive unit depends on the wage bids put forward by all the other firms operating
in the economy (cf. Guerrazzi, 2013; Guerrazzi and Sodini, 2018).
The existing literature on efficiency-wage competition focuses only on 2-firm – or 2-sector –
economies and until now nothing has been said about the consequences triggered by an increase in
the number of players. In this paper, I aim at filling that gap by exploring what happens in that
theoretical framework as the number of competing firms increases. In detail, drawing on Guerrazzi
(2013), I study the optimal wage behaviour of firms when all the productive units find profitable
to bid and pay the same wage and there are no labour-supply constraints so that some individuals
might actually experience involuntary unemployment. Moreover, I analyse the dynamic behaviour
of wages in the neighbourhood of the symmetric Nash equilibrium and I explore the features of the
full employment allocation.
The findings of this theoretical exploration reveal that the actual shape of the effort function is
crucial in determining key features of the model economy. In this regard, the efficiency-wage literature
usually has exploited two distinct analytical formulations for the link between wages and workers’
productivity, i.e., sigmoid and concave effort functions (cf. Stiglitz, 1973, 1976; Hahn, 1987). As I will
show below, the choice of one specific formulation leads to completely different outcomes with respect
to the other option. Specifically, when workers are endowed with a concave (sigmoid) effort function,
the wage behaviour of firms follows a collusive (competitive) pattern. Moreover, assuming that firms
adjust their current wage bid on the basis of the lagged bids put forward by their competitors, the
adoption of a concave (sigmoid) effort function implies that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is locally
unstable (stable) and the speed of divergence (convergence) is an increasing function of the number
of productive units engaged in the efficiency-wage competition process. Furthermore, with a concave
(sigmoid) effort function, the full employment of workers that are willing to work at the prevailing
wage is characterized by a degree of labour exploitation that increases (decreases) together with the
number of firms required to sustain that allocation.
Considering efficiency-wage economies with adverse selection, the theoretical findings outlined
above may provide some guidance in assessing what type of effort function is the best alternative
for a certain economy. At the same time, these results may have intriguing implications for the
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existence and persistence of involuntary unemployment and for the implementation of policies aimed
at increasing the level of employment.
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the related literature. Section 3
introduces the theoretical framework. Section 4 explores how wages, effort, employment and profits
prevailing in a symmetric Nash equilibrium depend on the number of competing firms. Section 5
analyses the dynamics of wages in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium. Section 6 addresses the
issue of labour exploitation when there is no involuntary unemployment. Finally, section 7 concludes
by offering some theoretical and policy implications for fighting unemployment in efficiency-wage
economies.
2 Related literature
This paper aims at building a bridge between the wide literature on efficiency wages and the one on
wage competition by analysing the effects driven by an extension of the number of firms operating
in the economy. The starting points are the seminal papers by Hahn (1987) and Summers (1988). In
the former, we find the first attempt to frame the strategic issues underlying a two-firm efficiency-
wage economy à la Solow (1979) in which workers’ effort depends positively (negatively) on the
internal (external) wage offer of each producer. In the latter, a very similar theoretical framework is
used to explore the fragility of equilibria, i.e., the strong sensitivity of equilibrium (un)employment
to changes in the parameters of the model, under the hypothesis that workers’ effort depends on
relative wages.
Drawing on similar ideas, van de Klundert (1989) and Jellal and Wolff (2003) develop two distinct
models with a dual labour market in which firms operating in the primary sector of the economy set
efficiency wages whereas in the secondary sector wages are set competitively. In these frameworks, the
interaction between the two sectors is established by an effort function in which the wages prevailing
in the primary (secondary) sector enter with a positive (negative) sign.
The theoretical contributions recalled above are mainly interested in demonstrating the possibility
of an equilibrium with involuntary unemployment and the persistence of wage differentials across
the different sectors of the economy. The strategic implications of the wage setting behaviour of
firms as well as the consequences triggered by an increase in the number of players, however, remain
completely on the background (cf. Guerrazzi, 2013; Guerrazzi and Sodini, 2018). Although it did not
reach any clear conclusion, these important aspects of the wage setting process have been somehow
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addressed by the most recent literature on wage competition.
On the one side, Bhasker and To (1999) develop a monopsonistic wage-competition model where
optimal wage bids are strategic complements and the symmetric wage-strategy prevailing in the Nash
equilibrium is a decreasing function of the number of competing firms, a feature that is acknowledged
also by the wage-competition model with heterogenous agents set forth by Hamilton et al. (2000).
The intuition behind these results is that in a non-Walrasian labour market employers can easily
collude with each other with the aim of getting favourable conditions regarding wages. On the other
side, that view is challenged by Fiorillo et al. (2000) who develop an oligopsonistic wage-competition
model in which the equilibrium wage increases together with the number of productive units. In this
framework, labour market frictions work in favour of employed workers so that when the number of
employers increases, the competition process triggered to hire the best available workers put upward
pressure on wages.
In this paper, confirming the intuitions put forward by Summers (1988), I show that in an
efficiency-wage economy populated by many firms in which internal wage offers enter the production
possibilities in a labour-augmenting way whereas external offers do exactly the opposite, optimal
wage bids are always strategic complements (cf. Guerrazzi, 2013). By contrast, the effects on the
equilibrium levels of the wage, employment and profit driven by an increase of the number of firms
are strictly related to the path of the wage measured in efficiency units. The analysis developed
below reveals that the behaviour of such a critical indicator mirrors the actual cost of labour borne
by firms and deeply relies on actual shape of the effort function taken into consideration.
3 Theoretical framework
I consider an efficiency-wage economy in which there are N – with N > 2 – identical firms indexed
by i that compete with each other to hire high-quality workers. As in Solow (1979), each firm realizes
that there is a positive relation between the wage that it pays and the efficiency of recruited workers
so that the screening of the available labour force occurs through increasing wage bids. Assuming
asymmetric information between firms and workers, such a positive link can be seen as the reflection
of the increasing function between workers’ ability and their acceptance wage usually observed by
employers who hire applicants from a labour pool under adverse selection conditions (cf. Weiss,
1991).
On the output side, following Guerrazzi and Sodini (2018) and Guerrazzi (2013), I assume that
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each productive unit – no matters the size of N – is endowed with the following production function:
Yi = A (ei (·)Li)α A > 0, 0 < α < 1 (1)
where Yi is the output of the i-th firm, A is a measure of its total factor productivity, ei (·) is the
effort provided by the single worker hired by the i-th firm, Li is the number of hired workers, whereas
α is the curvature of the production function.1
In the remainder of the paper, I will assume that the production technology described by eq.
(1) is freely accessible to all the firms that decide to enter the market for goods and total output
produced in the economy (NYi) is always totally sold. The consequences implied by the existence
of constraints in the access to the production technology and the effects of deficiencies in effective
demand will be briefly addressed in the final section of the manuscript.
The representative firm hires workers in a spot labour market where workers have homogenous
preferences over effort provision. In this regard, let wS (LF ) - with ∂wS/∂LF > 0 - be the (invertible)
aggregate Marshallian labour supply, where LF denotes the number of workers that are willing to
work in the economy provided that wS (·) is paid. In other words, when all the competing firms find
profitable to pay a wage equal to w, LF (w) workers are actually willing to work. Consequently, given
the wage prevailing in the economy, whenever LF (w) is higher (lower) than the aggregate demand
for labour (NLi), the labour market experiences an excess supply (demand). By contrast, whenever
LF (w) is equal to NLi, there is full employment since the LF (w) workers that are willing to work
are actually pro quota employed by the N competing firms. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume
that the reservation wage is equal to zero so that wS (0) = 0. That hypothesis makes sure that when
firms bid a positive wage even labour supply is positive so that some workers are actually willing to
provide their labour services.
According to eq. (1), the productive input of each worker hired by the representative firm is given
by ei(·). Such an expression - usually called effort function - conveys in an explicit and continuous
manner the link between the efficiency of the employed workforce and the wages paid by competing
firms. As stated in the introduction, a special feature of this paper is that I will take into consideration
two distinct well-behaved analytical alternatives that have been widely exploited in the theoretical
applications of the efficiency-wage theory. On the one hand, extending the expressions in Hahn
(1987) and Guerrazzi (2013), I consider a concave specification given by
1The same production function is used by Akerlof (1982) and Alexopulos (2004). None of the results derived in









κ > 0, 0 < β < 1 (2)
where κ is an independent component of effort, wi is the internal wage paid the i-th firm, wj is
the external wage paid by a generic opponent of the i-th firm indexed with j ̸= i, whereas β is the
curvature of the effort function.2
Recognizing that energy requirements of employed workers - as measured by consumed calories -
are given by an exponential combination of their effort and their body mass, Dalgaard and Strulik
(2011) show that a concave effort function can be derived from physiological principles. In addition,
as argued by Wu and Ho (2012), an effort function like the one in eq. (2) implies the existence of
a positive firm-specific minimum-wage defined as wmini ≡
N−1∑
j ̸=i
wj − κ below which effort provision
is equal to zero. Obviously, this means that κ <
N−1∑
j ̸=i
wj. Consequently, in this framework, the
parameter κ counterweights the sum of external wage opportunities in order to yield the wage-floor
above which the individual worker employed by the i-th firm find profitable to providing a positive
level of effort. Since I assumed that the reservation wage is equal to zero, it is worth noting that as
long as wi is positive but lower than w
min
i , some workers will be actually willing to offer their labour
services by participating to labour market activities. Eq. (2), however, implies that these workers -
when employed by the representative firm - will find profitable to shirk instead of providing effort by
revealing themselves as unproductive (cf. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bulow and Summers, 1986).
On the other hand, drawing on Stiglitz (1973, 1976), I consider also the sigmoid – or s-shaped









γ > 1 (3)
where γ is a parameter that measures the steepness of the effort function.3
The sigmoid effort function does not imply the existence of a minimum wage so that with such
2Theoretical efficiency-wage models with concave effort functions can be found in Sparks (1986) and Walsh (1999).
Moreover, an attempt to provide an empirical estimation of a concave effort function for a panel of OECD countries
is given by de la Croix et al. (2000).
3As it will become clear in the subsequent section, in eq. (3) the single external wage opportunity is not raised to
the power of γ as it happens instead to the internal wage offer since this would be inconsistent with the definition of
a well-defined symmetric wage strategy. Further details are available from the author upon request.
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, the function in eq. (3) has an inflection point. In geometrical terms,
this means that for values of wi between zero and w
inf
i the function in eq. (3) is convex whereas for
values of wi higher than w
inf
i the function is concave. This is the reason why such an effort function
is dubbed as sigmoid. According to Stiglitz (1973), such a characterization can be rationalized
on evolutionary terms. Specifically, the interval in which wi is between zero and w
inf
i denotes a
region of starvation. Within this range, the internal wage offer of the representative firm is so low
that additional increments in wage payments increase workers’ effort provision at increasing rates.
Afterward, when wi is on the right of w
inf
i , the wage is sufficiently high that workers are in the
position to fully satisfy their primary needs. In the latter case, diminishing returns dominate so that
additional wage increments increase effort provision at decreasing rates.
Consistently with Solow (1979), the effort functions in eq.s (2) and (3) describe an efficiency-
wage economy in which each firm tries to screen its applicants by exploiting its current wage bid.
Indeed, despite the different shapes, eq.s (2) and (3) state that workers’ effort for the i-th firm is an
increasing function of its own wage offer. Along the lines of the already mentioned efficiency-wage
competition literature, however, I assume that - for each productive unit - attainable effort react
to the sum of external wage opportunities. In other words, this means that ei (·) is assumed to
be a decreasing function of the wage offer individualistically put forward by each single opponent.
The underlying hypothesis is that an improvement (a deterioration) of external wage opportunities
may have a negative (positive) effect on internal morale and working effectiveness (cf. Hahn, 1987;
Summers, 1988; van de Klundert, 1988; Jellal and Wolff, 2003; Guerrazzi, 2013; Guerrazzi and Sodini,
2018). Strictly speaking, when the output competitors of firm i increase their wage offer, the i-th
productive unit - unless it increases the wage paid to its employed workforce - is assumed to suffer
a productivity drop.
According to Summers (1988), the expressions in eq.s (2) and (3) should posit that individual
effort depends upon the divergence between the internal wage and the average of the wage bids put
forward by rival firms. The choice to rely on the sum rather than on the average can be rationalized
as follows. First, the existence of cognitive limitations could prevent workers from calculating the
average of the wage bids in a precise manner (cf. Choi et al. 2014). Moreover, the simplest
option conveyed by eq.s (2) and (3) is consistent with the literature on labour market coordination
failures pioneered by Keynes (1936). This literature stresses that workers may have some concern
for relative wages (e.g. Hoover, 1995). Consequently, as the wage offer of a rival firm increases
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(decreases), workers may adjust their work intensity downward (upward) in the attempt to obtain a
positive (negative) wage adjustment that preserves the original relative positions. To confirm that,
Bulow and Summers (1986) argue that firms are usually extremely concerned with assessing where
they stand in the wage distribution and this provide a rationale for the large number of available
compensation surveys.4
Taking the wage distribution as given, the effort functions described above deliver information
not only on how individual work intensity reacts to internal and external wage opportunities, but
also on how workers’ productivity is affected by the number of competing firms. Specifically, the
expressions in eq.s (2) and (3) share the feature that in a symmetric wage equilibrium, i.e., when
wi = w > 0 for all i = 1, ..., N , effort for the individual firm – say e (w) – is a decreasing function of
the number of productive units operating in the economy. Technically speaking, in the concave and
in the sigmoid case respectively, it is straightforward to derive that
e (w) = (κ− (N − 2)w)β (4)
e (w) =
1
1 + (N − 1)w1−γ
(5)
The economic rationale for the results in eq.s (4) and (5) can be given by considering the possible
effects on workers’ morale driven by the tightness of labour demand. In other words, the higher
(lower) the number of firms in the economy, the higher (lower) the employment opportunities for
the single worker. Consequently, everything else being equal, as the number of productive players
increases (decreases), the individual effort for each firm will be lower (higher) since workers realize
that they might have the chance to be employed (it might be difficult to find a job) in a different
productive unit (cf. Kuang and Wang, 2017; Masters, 2016).
A similar negative relationship between e (·) and N is also acknowledged by Lazear et al. (2016)
who put forward the possibility that employers may be actively engaged in sorting workers. Specif-
ically, during an expansion (recession), when the number of productive units tends to increase (de-
crease), new entering (remaining) firms may find profitable to employ less productive applicants that
4An additional intriguing features of eq.s (2) and (3) also shared by the alternatives in which the deviation from the
average is taken into account, is the fact that when all the firms change their wage bid by the same amount, individual
effort changes accordingly in the same direction. A rationale for that pattern is that workers may have some concern
not only for relative wages but also for the labour share of output. Indeed, the higher the wage levels, the lower the
profits of the firms and the higher the output share available for workers.
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incumbent employers have avoided to hire (retain highly productive insiders and letting go the least
productive). In this way, when the number of firms increases (decreases), the average efficiency of
employed workers may actually fall (increase) as actually conveyed by eq.s (4) and (5).5
Having regard to a symmetrical wage strategy, it becomes possible to grasp an important dif-
ference between the two effort functions in eq.s (2) and (3), i.e., the implied differences in effort
response to changes in internal and external wage offers. Indeed, with a concave effort function, the










= β (κ− (N − 2)w)β−1 (6)
The result in (6) suggests that a concave effort function may be suitable for workers employed
in firms that operate in homogenous industries or for workers that are subject to negligible mobility
costs (cf. Gruetter and Lalive, 2009).
By contrast, with a sigmoid effort function, the effort responses to changes in internal and external
wage offers are asymmetric. Specifically, the effort increase triggered by an increase in the internal
wage offer is higher than the corresponding effort reduction – taken in modulus – induced by an










The result in (7) suggests that a sigmoid effort function may be suitable for workers who devel-
oped a strong attachment to their job – probably for the good working conditions prevailing in the
industries where firms are operating – or for workers who are subject to non-negligible mobility costs
(cf. Markey et al. 2012).
Before introducing the strategic apparatus developed in the remaining sections of the paper,
it might be important to stress that in the version of the efficiency-wage theory exploited in this
work monitoring and shirking problems are not directly addresses (cf. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
Strictly speaking, when the wage w is paid by all the N competing firms, the implied level of
effort e (w) is actually provided by the NLi employed workers out of the LF (w) that are willing
to work. On a principal-agent perspective, this means that from the side of workers the relevant
5In order to avoid the questionable situation in which workers reduce effort provision when a new firm enters the
output market by offering a barely positive wage, we can assume that entrance is impeded when entering productive
units bid a wage below a certain threshold.
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participation constraint is given by labour supply whereas solving eq.s (2) and (3) with respect to
the internal wage yields alternative and ever-binding incentive compatibility constraints according to
which firms’ expectations of effort provision are always fulfilled.6 Consequently, taking into account
the expressions in eq.s (1)− (3), the problem of the representative firm can be written as
max
ei,Li


















when effort is sigmoid
wi > wS (NLi)
(8)
where πi is the profit of the i-th productive unit.
As I argued above, the problem in (8) shows that the representative firm maximizes its profits
with respect to ei and Li by taking into account two distinct constraints. The former is the incentive
compatibility constraint and depending on the shape of the effort function, it gives the wage that
the firm has to pay in order to influence the individual efficiency of employed workers. The latter
is the participation constraint and it states that - given the number of firms - the pair (wi (ei) , Li)
chosen by each employer must lead workers to offer the required amount of labour services. Such
a constraint is binding in the full employment allocation whereas it holds as inequality when the
labour market experiences an excess supply.
Echoing some arguments put forward in the literature on malfeasance and enforcement, the
incentive compatibility constraints implied by eq.s (2) and (3) provide a compensation scheme with
two components: one related to outside opportunities and the other related to workers’ performance
(cf. Becker and Stigler, 1974). Specifically, in the concave case, the incentive compatibility constraint
states that the firm has to pay a wage that is given by a mark-up over the minimum wage implied
by eq. (2) whereas the aforementioned mark-up is described by a convex increasing function of effort
provision defined in the closed interval [0,+∞]. Furthermore, in the sigmoid case defined by eq. (3),
the incentive compatibility constraint reveals that the firm has to pay a wage equal to a geometrical
average between the sum of external wage bids and a convex increasing function of effort provision
defined in the open internal [0, 1).
6On a general equilibrium perspective, a tentative to track down reduced forms for workers’ preferences implied
by the concave and sigmoid effort specifications by means of straightforward integration can be found, respectively, in
Guerrazzi (2013) and Wu and Ho (2012).
10
When the participation constraint is not binding so that workers are out of their labour supply,
the solution of the problem in (8) allow us to derive the reaction functions expressed in terms of the
internal wage offer for the single firm that holds, respectively, in the concave and in the sigmoid case.



















The two expressions in eq.s (9) and (10) reveal that – for each firm – optimal wage bids are
strategic complements no matter the shape of the effort function. In other words, with a concave or
a sigmoid effort function, whenever one of the opponent raises (lowers) its wage bid, it is in the best
interest of each competing firm to raise (lower) its bid as well.7 According to Summers (1998), this
feature is a key aspect of any wage theory in which there is a concern for relative wages.
4 Wages, effort, employment and profits in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium
In the model economy described in section 2, a symmetric Nash equilibrium can be defined as a
situation in which all the competing firms find profitable to bid and pay the same wage so that,
alternatively, the expressions in eq.s (9) and (10) simultaneously holds for all the N productive
units. As maintained by Guerrazzi (2013) and Guerrazzi and Sodini (2018), this means that the
elasticity of the relevant effort function (incentive compatibility) with respect to the internal wage
(effort) is equal to one for all the firms. In other words, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium the
Solow condition is valid in a generalized manner throughout the economy (cf. Solow, 1979). In
this section, I will show that whenever employers are not constrained by labour supply and all the
firms have access to the same production technology with no deficiencies in effective demand, the
shape of the effort function is very important in assessing how the number of firms operating in
the economy influences the equilibrium allocation. The implications of a binding labour supply are
instead discussed in section 6.
7The non-monotonicity of the strategic relation among optimal wage bids in a similar efficiency-wage competition
framework is addressed by Guerrazzi and Sodini (2018).
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Without any loss of generality, I start by making the hypothesis that effort has the concave shape
outlined in eq. (2). In that case, assume that w∗ is the common value of the wage paid by all the
competing firms. Consequently, the reaction function in eq. (9) implies that
w∗ =
(N − 1)w∗ − κ
1− β
(11)
Solving eq. (11) for w∗ allows us to write the wage prevailing in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
for each individual firm as a function of the number of competing firms and the parameters of the
effort function. Formally speaking, eq. (11) implies that
w∗ =
κ
N − 2 + β
(12)
Since I assumed that N is higher or equal to 2, the symmetric wage-strategy that holds when
effort is concave is always characterized by a positive value of the equilibrium wage.
When all the firms find profitable to pay a wage equal to w∗, eq. (2) implies that the effort
supplied by each employed worker is equal to
e∗ = (κ− (N − 2)w∗)β (13)




N − 2 + β
)β
(14)
The results in eq.s (12) and (14) imply that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium the profit of the









N − 2 + β
L∗ (15)
where L∗ is the equilibrium level of employment.









N − 2 + β
)β
− κ
N − 2 + β
= 0 (16)
Solving eq. (16) for L∗ allows us to find the level of employment prevailing in a symmetric Nash







N − 2 + β
)−(1−αβ))) 11−α
(17)
Moreover, plugging eq. (17) into eq. (15), the equilibrium level of profits can be written as





N − 2 + β
)−α(1−β)) 11−α
(18)
To sum up the expressions in eq.s. (12), (14), (17) and (18) the wage, the effort, the level of
employment and the profit prevailing in a symmetric Nash equilibrium for each individual firm when






















where Ψ (N) ≡ κ/ (N − 2 + β).
The expressions in (19) clearly show that when the effort function is concave a symmetric Nash
equilibrium is characterized by the fact that the wage and worker’s effort (employment and profit)
decrease (increase) together with the number of competing firms (cf. Bhasker and To, 1999; Hamilton
et al. 2000). In this case, interestingly, when N tends to infinity, L∗ and π∗ tend to explode whereas
labour becomes a free good for firms, i.e., the equilibrium wage tends to zero. Moreover, it is worth
noting that with a concave effort function variations in the number of firms lead to a counter-cyclical
effort pattern (cf. Guerrazzi, 2008). Specifically, when the number of firms increases (decreases),
aggregate labour demand increases (decreases) as well. Furthermore, the wage and the effort fall
(increase) by leading to a reduction (contraction) of labour supply. The lower (higher) labour supply
implies a reduction (rise) of involuntary unemployment.
The economic rationale for the results in (19) can be given as follows. When the effort function is
concave, the wage per unit of effort is a decreasing function of the number of firms. Indeed, dividing
the RHS of eq. (12) by the RHS of eq. (14), we easily derive that w∗/e∗ is equal to β−β (Ψ (N))1−β.
Therefore, as the number of opponents increases, each productive unit is able to buy effective labour
at a lower unit cost and this allows the recruitment of a larger number of workers. Moreover,
hiring more employees at a lower wage counterbalances the lower effort of workers by leading to
higher profits. Consequently, when the effort function is concave, the equilibrium wage behaviour of
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competing firms follows a collusive pattern. In other words, when the number of productive units
increases, the optimal wage behaviour of each firm leads to a generalized reduction of the wage per
efficiency units paid by employers and this, in turn, provides a price signal that triggers the reduction
of the wage bids put forward individualistically by the N competing firms.
Fixing α = β = 0.5 and A = κ = 1, the patterns of wages, effort, employment and profits
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Figure 1: Wages, effort, employment and profits in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
Concave effort function (α = β = 0.5, A = κ = 1, N = 2, ..., 20)
The diagrams in figure 1 show that under the suggested calibration the equilibrium wage as well
as the equilibrium effort suffer a substantial reduction when the number of firms shifts from two to
three. By contrast, the increases in equilibrium employment and equilibrium profits observed as N
becomes bigger are quite smooth.
Following the same procedure implemented above, it is possible to show that when the effort
function has the sigmoid shape outlined in eq. (3) the quadruplet
(































where Ω (N) ≡ ((N − 1) (γ − 1))1/(γ−1).
The reaction functions in eq.s (9) and (10) revealed that the sign of the strategic relation among
optimal wage bids is the same no matter the shape of the effort function. The results in (20), how-
ever, signal a regime change with respect to the findings summarized in (19). Specifically, when the
effort function is sigmoid, a symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by the fact that the wage
(employment and profits) increases (decrease) as the number of competing firm increases (cf. Fiorillo
et al. 2000). By contrast, the number of productive units in the economy does not influence equilib-
rium workers’ effort and the implied expression for e∗ confirms that equilibrium labour effectiveness
falls into the interval [0, 1). In addition, recalling that N > 2 and γ > 1, the expression for Ω (N)
shows that in the sigmoid case labour can never be a free good for firms. Eq. (10) actually reveals
that with a sigmoid effort the reaction functions of firms are simultaneously verified even when all the
productive units bid a wage equal to zero. Nevertheless, such an allocation is not a Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, if all the firms but one offers a wage equal to zero, the productive unit that bids a positive
wage obtains a positive effort and achieves positive profits (cf. Guerrazzi and Sodini, 2018).
From an economic point of view, the findings in (20) can be rationalized as follows. As opposed
to what happens with a concave effort function, in the sigmoid case the wage per unit of effort
increases together with the number of firms. Indeed, according to the first and the second element
in the array in (20), w∗/e∗ is equal to (γ/ (γ − 1))Ω (N). Therefore, in this case each firm tries
to overbid the others in the attempt to secure better workers for itself. When all the firms behave
in this way, however, attainable effort for the single productive unit remains the same because the
effort reduction triggered by the larger number of players is exactly counterbalanced by their higher
wage offers. Consequently, when the effort function is sigmoid, the optimal wage setting behaviour
of rival firms can be dubbed as genuinely competitive. In other words, an increase in the number
of players is responsible for an increase of the wage per efficiency units and this, in turn, generates
a price signal that leads competing firms to overbid each other in the vain attempt to increase
the productive effectiveness of their employees. Obviously, such an overbidding process implies the
already mentioned decreasing path of individual profits.
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Setting γ = 2.5, α = 0.5 and A = 1, the patterns of wages, effort, employment and profits
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Figure 2: Wages, effort, employment and profits in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
Sigmoid effort function (γ = 2.5, α = 0.5, A = 1, N = 2, ..., 20)
The diagrams in figure 2 show that the equilibrium wage smoothly raises when the number of
competing firms increases. By contrast, the level of equilibrium employment and equilibrium profits
substantially drop when the number of firms shifts from two to three. Such a behaviour mirrors the
downward jumps observed in the wage and in the effort as found in the concave case plotted in figure
1.
5 Wage dynamics
Let us assume that the efficiency-wage competition game set forth in section 2 is played as a dynamic
Cournot output game in which each firm refines its beliefs about the behaviour of its competitors
by observing their actual choices (cf. Theocharis, 1960; Varian, 1992). In the present context, this
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means that – in any given time period – each productive unit adjusts its wage bid by observing the
wage paid by the other firms and conjecturing that external bids will remain unchanged until the
next period (cf. Guerrazzi, 2013; Guerrazzi and Sodini, 2018). Depending on the shape of the effort
function, and recalling the reaction functions in eq.s (9) and (10), the evolution of wages over time




















where i = 1, .., N .
In the first case, i.e., when the effort function has a concave shape, the Jacobian matrix associated
the to the linear dynamic system in (21) is given by a N × N matrix whose elements on the main
diagonal are equal to zero whereas all the other elements are equal to (1− β)−1. Such a coefficient
corresponds to the constant value of ∂wi,t/∂wj,t−1 retrieved for all the eligible js. Consequently, the
eigenvalues of such a matrix are given by the N elements of the following array:
(
− 1







Since 0 < β < 1 and N > 2, all the components of (23) are higher than one in modulus. Conse-
quently, when the effort function is concave the symmetric Nash equilibrium is locally asymptotically
unstable. In other words, whenever one of the firm bids a wage different from w∗, the system in (21)
tends to explode in finite time.8 Moreover, the last element of the array in (23) reveal that the speed
of explosion of individual wage bids is higher (lower), the higher (lower) the number of competing
firms. Therefore, when the optimal wage behaviour of firms follows a collusive pattern and the
efficiency-wage competition process is played as a game of alternate wage bids, an increase in the
number of productive units is a further destabilizing feature for the model economy. This result some-
how recalls the one on the fragility of equilibria highlighted by Summers (1988) in efficiency-wage
economies with many firms concerned with relative wages. In the present context, the instability of
the Nash equilibrium can be explained by the linear and more than proportional response of internal
8Using a concave effort function, Guerrazzi (2013) shows that the symmetric Nash equilibrium can be stabilized by
assuming that firms adjust their wage bids in the direction of increasing profits by conjecturing – in a myopic manner
– a certain degree of substitutability among optimal wage offers.
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wage offers to changes in external bids implied by the reaction function in eq. (9) implemented in
the dynamic system in (21).
In the remaining case, i.e., when the effort function has a sigmoid shape, the Jacobian matrix
associated to the non-linear dynamic system in (22) is given by a N ×N matrix whose elements on
the main diagonal are equal to zero whereas all the other elements are equal to ((N − 1) γ)−1. Such a
coefficient depends and the number of competing firms and corresponds to the analytical expression
for ∂wi,t/∂wj,t−1 evaluated for wj,t−1 equal to Ω (N). Consequently, the eigenvalues of such a matrix
are given by the N elements of the following array:
(
− 1







Given that γ > 1 and N > 2, all the components of (24) are lower than one in modulus.
Consequently, when the effort function is sigmoid the symmetric Nash equilibrium is locally asymp-
totically stable. This means that the wage bids put forward by all the competing firms tend to
converge towards w∗ by steering the convergence of the others endogenous variables. Moreover, the
first N − 1 elements of the array in (24) reveal that the speed of convergence of individual wage bids
is higher (lower), the higher (lower) the number of competing firms. Therefore, when the optimal
wage behaviour of firms follows a competitive pattern, an increase in the number of productive units
operating in the market for goods is a further stabilizing feature for the model economy. In this case,
the analogy with fragility result highlighted by Summers (1988) does not apply because the reaction
function in eq. (10) implemented in the dynamic system in (22) implies a smoothed response of
internal wage offers to changes in external bids.
6 Full employment and labour exploitation
A straightforward implication of the analytical findings outlined in section 4 is that the aggregate
demand for labour prevailing in a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NL∗) increases (decreases) with the
number of competing firms when workers are endowed with a concave (sigmoid) effort function.
When labour supply is not binding, i.e., whenever NL∗ is lower than the aggregate supply of
labour that holds when the equilibrium wage is equal to w∗, the model economy experiences some
involuntary unemployment. In that case, none of the N profit-maximizing firms will accept to hire
applicants that are willing to work for less than the equilibrium values of the wage offer alternatively
conveyed by the first element of the arrays in (19) and (20). It can also happen, however, that
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labour supply is binding so that NL∗ coincides with the aggregate supply of labour that holds when
the wage is equal to its equilibrium level so that the economy achieves full employment.9 In the
latter case, taking the participation constraint as binding in the maximization problem formulated
in (8), the results in (19) and (20) can be exploited to provide an interesting characterization of the
full employment allocation that may prevail as a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the efficiency-wage
economy described in section 3.
Without any loss of generality, let us assume that there exists a sufficiently large value of N - say
NFE > 2 - that guarantees the implementation of a full employment allocation as a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, so that LF (w∗) = NFEL
∗, where LF (·) is the inverse of the aggregate labour supply
defined in section 3. In other words, taking into account the results in the first element of (19) and
(20), NFE has to alternatively verify one of the following expressions:
κ
NFE − 2 + β
= wS (NFEL
∗) (25)
((NFE − 1) (γ − 1))
1
γ−1 = wS (NFEL
∗) (26)
Whenever eq.s (25) or (26) hold, the model economy described in section 3 rests in situation
of symmetric Nash equilibrium that does not admit the possibility of involuntary unemployment.
Indeed, all the workers that are willing to work at wS (NFEL
∗) are actually employed by the NFE
competing firms so that the participation constraint in problem (8) holds as equality. In that situa-
tion, deriving the first-order condition for Li allows us to state that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
with full employment the value of L∗ in each productive unit has to be consistent with the following
expression:




∗ + wS (NFEL
∗) i = 1, ..., NFE (27)
where Φ (L∗) ≡ αA (ei (wS (NFEL∗))L∗)−(1−α) and Γ (L∗) ≡ (∂ei/∂wS) (∂wS/∂LF )NFEL∗+ei (wS (NFEL∗)).
Eq. (27) is the individual labour demand function of the NFE firms that – as a whole – employ all
the workers that are willing to work at wS (NFEL
∗). Such an expression is qualitatively similar to the
corresponding condition that holds in a monopsonistic labour market in which labour is purchased
only by one buyer and offered by many sellers (cf. Boal and Ransom, 1997). In other words, eq.
9According to Weiss (1991), the full employment allocation is actually achieved even when the symmetric Nash
equilibrium implies that firms are rationed in the labour market, i.e., when NL∗ is higher than the aggregate labour
supply that holds at the prevailing equilibrium wage.
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(27) states that the marginal product of labour, i.e., the LHS of (27), must be equal to the marginal
expenditure for labour, i.e., the RHS of (27). More precisely, on the LHS there is the marginal
productivity of labour (Φ (L∗)) adjusted in order to consider the positive effect on production driven
by a (marginal) wage increase (Γ (L∗)) (cf. Lin, 2015; Scapparone, 2015). On the RHS there is instead
the sum between the full employment wage offer (wS (NFEL
∗)) and a positive component related to
fact the each firm realizes that it is operating along the relevant labour supply ((∂wS/∂LF )NFEL
∗).














Figure 3: Full employment and labour exploitation
The diagram in figure 3 shows that - for each value of Li - the marginal expenditure for labour
((∂wS/∂LF )NFELi + wS (NFELi)) is definitely higher than the offering wage (wS (NFELi)). Con-
sequently, when the model economy reaches a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all the workers
that are willing to work at the prevailing wage are actually employed, each competing firm finds
itself in the position to pay the labour factor less than its marginal contribution to corporate rev-
enues which are measured by the segment OB. Analyzing monopsonistic markets, Robinson (1933)
called that phenomenon exploitation of labour. By contrast, when the economy reaches a symmetric
Nash equilibrium with involuntary unemployment there is no exploitation. In other words, when
NL∗ < LF (w∗) or, equivalently, w∗ > wS (NL
∗), employers are on their labour demand but workers
are out of their labour offer so that (∂wS/∂LF )NFEL
∗ is equal to zero. Therefore, in the latter case,
employed workers are paid according to their marginal contribution to corporate revenues (cf. Lin,
2015; Scapparone, 2015).
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Recalling that labour supply is upward-sloped so that ∂wS/∂LF > 0, the RHS of eq. (27)
reveals that in this setting the labour exploitation is an increasing function of NFEL
∗. Therefore,
taking into account the results in the arrays in (19) and (20), it is possible to conclude that when
the effort function is concave (sigmoid), the exploitation of labour carried out by each firm is –
ceteris paribus – an increasing (decreasing) function of the number of productive units required to
sustain the full employment allocation as a symmetric Nash equilibrium.10 If we think about it, the
latter result is far from surprising. Indeed, when the wage behaviour of competing firms follows a
collusive (competitive) pattern the exploitation of labour increases as the number of firms increases
(decreases).
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, drawing on Guerrazzi (2013), I explore the consequences of extending the number of
competing firms in an efficiency-wage competition setting by taking into account that workers’ effort
can alternatively follow a concave or a sigmoid pattern with respect to the internal wage offer of each
player (cf. Stiglitz, 1973, 1976; Hahn, 1987).
To the best of my knowledge, in the efficiency-wage literature there are no point estimations of
the actual shape of effort functions. Therefore, the relation between labour effectiveness provided by
workers and the wage paid by firms in the real world remains at least uncertain. Some indirect insights
on the wage-effort relation can be derived, however, from contributions on nutritional efficiency-
wages and product market deregulation. On the one hand, Powell and Murphy (2014) argue that the
nutrition-based efficiency wage theory has been an important framework to explain unemployment
persistence in poor countries. On the other hand, Ebell and Haefke (2003) show that in developed
countries product market deregulation is usually associated with stronger flows of firms’ entry and
increasing wages.
Combining these arguments with the theoretical analysis developed throughout the paper, it
seems reasonable to associate the concave (sigmoid) effort specification to developing (developed)
countries. In the former case, an efficiency-wage model grounded on the concave effort function in
eq. (2) for which Dalgaard and Strulik (2011) offered a physiological explanation might provide a
rationale for the persistence of unemployment observed in poor countries (cf. Leibenstein, 1957;
Stiglitz, 1976; Mirrlees, 1976; Bliss and Stern, 1978). Moreover, since the antitrust regulation is
10When effort is sigmoid, the reduction of L∗ induced by an increase of is so strong that NL∗ is always a decreasing
function of the number of competing firms. Formally speaking, in this case (∂L∗/∂N) (N/L∗) > 1 .
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usually less stringent in these economies so that firms are likely to collude, it may also happen that
increases in the number of productive units may actually lead to wage reductions (cf. Cook, 2002).
In the latter case, on the contrary, an efficiency-wage model in which workers are endowed with the
sigmoid function of eq. (3) where increases in the number of firms go together with increasing wages
seems to corroborate the available empirical evidence on wage dynamics triggered by product market
deregulation in richer countries (cf. Ebell and Haefke, 2009).
The analytical findings resumed above may also have important implications for the theoretical
apparatus developed in this paper. First, in an efficiency-wage economy like the one described in
section 3 the existence and persistence of involuntary unemployment cannot be attributed to the wage
setting behaviour of firms in an unequivocal manner, but it can be seen as the consequence of the
presence of a too limited or, alternatively, too higher number of competing firms. Consequently, when
the effort function has a concave (sigmoid) specification, policies of deregulation (stricter regulation)
of the product market aimed at increasing (reducing) the number of productive units in the economy
may be well effective in reducing unemployment even without any intervention on the labour market.
Strictly speaking, an increase (a reduction) in the number of firms may be able to generate a reduction
of wages that would allow the expansion of the employed labour force and the reduction of labour
supply. Obviously, when the effort function is concave (sigmoid) and the wage behaviour of firms is
collusive (competitive) – in order to avoid the likely opposition of workers (firms) – the additional
profits realized by firms (wage bill gained by new employees) should be used to make side payments
to their additional employees (the remaining productive units).
The generality of the policy implications just stated deeply depends on the assumptions according
to which firms have no limitation in accessing the production technology and demand constraints on
the market for goods are missing. For instance, when the achievement of full employment requires
the entering of new firms on the market and the access to the available production technology
is somehow restricted – maybe for the existence of legally binding patents – the eradication of
involuntary unemployment can actually become quite difficult (cf. Langinier, 2004). Moreover,
when a reduction of wages is associated to a parallel reduction of the aggregate demand for goods,
the number of existing firms cannot be tuned in order to achieve full employment (cf. Setterfield,
2010). Furthermore, the analysis developed throughout the paper deeply relies on the hypothesis
that among workers and among productive firms there are no heterogeneities and this may put some
limits in extending all the conclusions to the real economy (cf. Kirman, 1992). For example, a pool
of firms with different production functions and/or workers endowed with different effort functions
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may hinder the straightforward derivation of the monotonic relationships illustrated in figures 1 and
2. All the implied extensions are left to further developments.
Appendix: Derivation of the reaction functions
Without any loss of generality, assume that the effort function has a concave shape as conveyed by
eq. (2). In this case, when the participation constraint is not binding and the internal wage offer of
each player is substituted for the expression of the relevant incentive compatibility constraint, the
problem of the representative firm can be written as
max
ei,Li









Recalling that wmini ≡
N−1∑
j ̸=i
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1
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i = 0 (A3)
Solving (A2) with respect to A (eiLi)
α−1 and plugging the result into (A3) allows us to find the
profit-maximizing effort provision as a function of the external wage bids and the parameters of the













Plugging the expression in (A4) into eq. (2) and solving for wi returns exactly the reaction
function in eq. (9). A similar procedure can be followed in order to retrieve the reaction function in
eq. (10) that holds in the case of a sigmoid effort function.
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